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Ever since the handover of the territory in 1997, Hong Kong has had its own unique law and its 
own economic system and international legal personality, and has not been integrated with 
Mainland China. The Basic Law guarantees the uniqueness of the Hong Kong SAR until 2047. 
But close economic ties between Hong Kong and the Mainland will promote closer economic 
integration. The Basic Law limits only a customs union and the introduction of a single currency, 
but not the formation of a Free Trade Agreement (hereafter FTA) and monetary union. FTA has 
already been realized in the form of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (hereafter 
CEPA). The Hong Kong SAR government, including the bureaucrat as well as the Chief 
Executive Tung Chee Hwa, was opposed to, and hesitant towards, the formation of a regional 
trade agreement with the Mainland, but the business community made them to adopt a positive 
attitude towards the CEPA. It is unclear how much integration can been deepened, but it can be 
argued that the current policy of the Hong Kong SAR is too supportive of business, and an 
excessive degree of economic integration may threaten the uniqueness of Hong Kong. But if 
Hong Kong achieves democracy and enjoys complete autonomy, it will be easy for economic 
integration to co-exist with the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ approach, in the interests of the 
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The ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereinafter referred to as the PRC) has been advanced as the solution for the 
reunification of Hong Kong with the PRC without the need for integration(1). Under the 
‘One Country, Two Systems’ policy, gradual change, including progress towards 
integration, can continue even after unification. In this paper, the author argues that 
integration between Mainland China and Hong Kong will be implemented after 
reunification.  
  ‘Unification’ means that two or more states form a new sovereign state with a single 
central government, which has jurisdiction over diplomacy. ‘Integration’ means 
integration of the functions of states, and integration of sovereignty except for the 
conduct of diplomatic relations.  
Integration is not a necessary requirement for unification. In the case of a federal state, 
there can be large differences among the various states and only a shallow degree of 
integration, and each of the constituent states can possess its own political, legal, and 
economic system. Sovereignty and integration are different concepts, as is evident in the 
relationship between a colony (such as Hong Kong) and its suzerain, (the United 
Kingdom before the handover of Hong Kong to the PRC). Integration is not necessary 
in cases where there is geographical remoteness, and where large differences occur in 
the socio-economic composition and economic relations of the territories concerned. 
But the need for integration of economic and legal systems can increase if distances 
are smaller and if economic relations between states or territories are close. That is true 
as regards the relationship between Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(hereinafter referred as Hong Kong SAR or Hong Kong) and Mainland China. In fact 
                                                  
(1) In this paper, ‘integration’ refers to the theory of international integration, including economic 
integration as argued by Béla Balassa. ‘Political integration’ in this paper means the integration 
of state functions concerning political fields and government organizations, and differs from 
issues of social integration such as the ‘unity of the people’. 
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the integration of Hong Kong SAR with Mainland China is inevitable. The Basic Law 
of the Hong Kong SAR, Article 5, stipulates that “the previous capitalist system and 
way of life will remain unchanged for 50 years” following 1997. But Mainland China is 
bound to move closer to becoming a ‘capitalist system’ in the future, and legal obstacles 
preventing a change in the system of the Hong Kong SAR will disappear. For this 
reason, it is difficult to envisage anything other than a transition from ‘One Country, 
Two Systems’ to ‘One Country, One System’ after the year 2047. 
Furthermore, the integration between Hong Kong SAR and Mainland China is likely 
to be accelerated by the increasing trend for regional integration, and may even be 
completed before 2047. First, the preferential treatment in Mainland China that Hong 
Kong companies have enjoyed should be abolished gradually following China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), unless Hong Kong and the 
Mainland sign an FTA. Second, the trend of FTA formation has spread into Northeast 
Asia, one of the last vacuums of FTAs in the world. Once Hong Kong and Mainland 
China each signs an FTA with third countries, the creation of an FTA between the two 
territories will become desirable (2).  
In the past, there has been little mention of economic integration between the two 
territories, and on the few occasions when integration has been discussed, 
commentators have pointed out the large disparity in economic levels between the two 
territories, and have argued that this disparity prevents economic integration. Sung Yun 
Wing has identified two obstacles. First, to be successful, an FTA should be mutually 
beneficial, but Mainland China would be unable to derive benefits from an FTA with 
the free port of Hong Kong. Second, the formation of a customs union, usually the 
next step after the signing of an FTA, requires a unified customs system. But Mainland 
China would not be able to remove its entire customs system, and Hong Kong would 
be unable to abolish its free trade policy that has been ordained by the Basic Law of 
the Hong Kong SAR. Third, a common market would require free internal migration 
of labor, which would also conflict with the Basic Law. Therefore, Sung concluded, 
                                                  
(2) Bank of China (Hong Kong). 2001. The Impacts of Asia Pacific Free Trade Zones on Hong 
Kong and Our Strategy, BOC Economic Review Monthly Vol. I No.3, 2001, Bank Of China 
(Hong Kong). 
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economic integration will not be deepened by institutionalization (3). 
But in late November 2001, it was made known that the Hong Kong Chief Executive 
Tung Chee Hwa had proposed the formation of an FTA with Mainland China to the 
PRC central government. The first step of economic integration became the 
government’s policy. This paper analyzes the integration that is occurring under the 
“One Country, Two Systems” formula, focusing mainly on the consistency of economic 
integration with the Basic Law, the changes to the “One Country, Two Systems” 
formula, and the transparency (the balance between business interests and the citizen) 
that needs to accompany integration. 
 
                                                  
(3) Yun-wing Sung(宋恩榮). 1998. Hong Kong and South China: The Economic Synergy(香港
與華南的經濟協作), Hong Kong: Commercial Press(商務書館). pp.155-156 (Chinese Edition) 
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1. “One Country, Two Systems” and Integration 
 
  The PRC government proposed “One Country, Two Systems” as the solution for 
achieving unification with Taiwan. Deng Xiao Ping, leader of the PRC at the time, said 
that “One Country, Two Systems” provides a model for a federal system(4), although he 
denied this subsequently. But the central government of the PRC gives “One Country” 
priority over “Two Systems”, and insists that the “One Country, Two Systems” formula 
adopted for Hong Kong is different from a federal system. The author tentatively 
accepts this official position of the PRC  and will attempt in this paper to justify his 
view by examining the current status of Hong Kong, and by considering the consistency 
of the“One Country, Two Systems” system with the international status of Hong Kong.  
 
Sovereignty and two economic systems  
A federal system (5) means a system in which sovereignty and jurisdiction are divided 
among federal (central) and state (local) governments. In federal systems, the central 
government has jurisdiction over foreign affairs (6), but cannot intervene in domestic 
affairs, over which state governments have jurisdiction. This seems close to the “One 
Country, Two Systems” system. But the Hong Kong SAR was established under the 
“One Country, Two Systems” formula by a “basic law” which was legislated by the 
National People’s Congress (the central parliament of PRC) (7), and which differed from 
                                                  
(4) Winston L. Yang(楊力宇). 1983. “Deng Xiaoping’s latest idea on peace reunification (鄧小平
對和平統一的最新構想)”. Seventies Monthly(七十年代月刊), August 1983, pp19 (in Chinese) 
(5) The origin of the federal system of government is the Swiss Confederation, but the first 
example of a transfer from a confederation into a federation was the United States of America.  
(6) Confederations of states do not have a central government responsible for diplomacy, and are 
not sovereign states.  
(7) Laws legislated by the National People’s Congress are called “basic laws”. Laws legislated by 
the Standing Committee of NPC are called “laws”. 
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constitutional law (Article 31 of PRC Constitution). The PRC Constitution does not 
stipulate the functions of the SAR and has not vested any jurisdiction in the SAR.  
The Basic Law of Hong Kong SAR makes provision for administration (Article 16) 
except for diplomacy (Article 13), and defense (Article 14), and the arrangements 
needed to maintain Hong Kong’s unique economic system (including customs, currency 
and the legal system). Moreover Hong Kong SAR is also permitted, as an economic 
entity independent from Mainland China, to sign treaties and to become a member of 
international organizations relating to economic and social issues.  
However, the fundamental purpose of the “Two Systems” part of the formula is to 
maintain the original economic system of Hong Kong (8). Some of articles of the Basic 
Law of Hong Kong SAR control the direction of the policies that may be taken by the 
government of the Hong Kong SAR. These include:- 
• Fiscal Policy：keeping the balance of the treasury budget (Article 107), maintaining 
low tax rates (article 108);  
• Finance and monetary policy： 
          maintaining Hong Kong’s status as international financial center  
                                        (Article 109) 
           maintaining by the bank issuing the currency the reserve fund system  
                                        (Article 111) 
           maintaining a free flow of capital within, into and out of the Region  
                                        (Article 112) 
• Custom policy：the SAR is not allowed to impose any tariff unless otherwise 
prescribed by law (Article 114)  
As will be made clear below, the articles of Section 1 (Public Finance, Monetary Affairs, 
                                                  
(8) Deng, Xiaoping, “Yi ge guojia, lian ge zhidu (One Country, Two Systems).”, In Deng 
Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected works of Deng Xiaoping) Volume II.ed. Zhonggong zhongyang 
wenxian bianji weiyuanhui (Editorial Committee on Party Literature, under Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe (People’s Publishing House), 
pp59 (in Chinese). 
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Trade, Industry and Commerce), Chapter V (Economy), determine the basic direction of 
the economic policy of the Hong Kong SAR. Insofar as the Hong Kong SAR is unable 
to change its system independently, its autonomy is incomplete. 
Moreover, several policies of the Hong Kong SAR are controlled by the PRC central 
government. Section 3 (Shipping) and Section 4 (Civil Aviation) stipulate that 
international negotiation on these issues by the Hong Kong SAR government cannot be 
carried out without the permission of the central government. What is more, Hong Kong 
SAR has not established its own examining authority on patents, even though it 
formulates policy with respect to patents (Article 139). Issuing a patent in Hong Kong 
can only be done if the patent has first been issued in the United Kingdom, Europe or 
the PRC (an amendment added just before the handover) (9). So even as regards the 
SAR’s economic system, separation between Hong Kong and Mainland China does not 
always take priority over the maintenance of the territory’s status before the handover. 
So far as political aspects are concerned, there is a conflict between the current ‘One 
Country, Two Systems’ formula and the realization of complete autonomy and 
democracy within Hong Kong SAR. In other words, it is not possible to exclude 
interventions by the central government of the PRC. Thus the current ‘One Country, 
Two Systems’ approach limits the freedom of activity of Hong Kong’s political 
community to the Legislative Council. Moreover the Chief Executive and the major 
Secretaries of bureaus are appointed by the PRC central government (Articles 15 and 
48). In this context, Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region but with incomplete 
autonomy. Universal suffrage election of the Chief Executive will in future make it 
difficult to intervene in the appointments of Secretaries, and to influence other political 
issues in the Hong Kong SAR, and if democracy develops, the autonomy of Hong Kong 
SAR can be accomplished. Deng Xiao Ping worried that complete autonomy in the 
Hong Kong SAR would threaten the ‘One Country’ framework (10). But concerns such 
                                                  
(9) For detail, see the web site of the Intellectual Property Department. 
(http://www.info.gov.hk/ipd/b5/information/publication/ip/iphk_c.htm#pat) 
(10) Deng, Xiaoping, “Zhongguo dalu he Taiwan heping tongyi de shexiang (An idea for the 
peaceful reunification of the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan).”, In Deng Xiaoping wenxuan 
(Selected works of Deng Xiaoping) Volume II., p.30. 
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as this seem groundless, because the future status of Hong Kong SAR with complete 
autonomy will be no more than the autonomy of Japanese local government units (the 
prefectures), whose governors are elected by the votes of residents, not by the central 
government appointment. Thus it is apparent that in the case of Hong Kong, the 
obstacles to autonomy are not only issues relating to the political system, but are also 
questions relating to the ‘Two Systems’ part of the formula. The PRC central 
government seems to fear that ‘One Country’, namely the PRC, could be caused to 
disintegrate by a federal system in which there is a different economic and legal system 
that is being operated by an autonomous government(11). It follows that the maintenance 
of different economic systems on the one hand and complete autonomy and 
democratization on the other are mutually exclusive issues so far as Hong Kong SAR is 
concerned.  
Furthermore, there is a second reason why the PRC central government is reluctant to 
give Hong Kong SAR complete autonomy. China fears that the development of 
democracy might create political damage in the form of initiatives taken by business 
leaders, causing a transformation of the current socio-economic situation and system of 
Hong Kong. Under British colonial rule, British colonial capital exerted a strong 
influence on the Hong Kong SAR government as a result of lobbying activities in 
London. After the handover, ethnic-Chinese capital became a source of political support 
for the PRC central government, and replaced the political status of British colonial 
capital in Hong Kong politics. The PRC central government and the leading ethnic 
Chinese capitalists had a common interest in ridding the Hong Kong economy of 
colonial privilege as well as in encouraging investment in Mainland China by ethnic 
Chinese capital. Moreover the PRC central government and ethnic Chinese capitalists 
were also agreed that Hong Kong should emphasize economic development, not politics 
or democracy (12). Leading ethnic Chinese capitalists were willing to compromise on 
                                                  
(11) Yugoslavia is a good example of a situation in which vesting each republic with economic 
sovereignty can lead to the collapse of a federal state. Yugoslavia’s experience, as well as the 
collapse of former Soviet Union, has provided lessons to the PRC. 
(12) On the relationship between the PRC central government and Hong Kong ethnic Chinese 
capital, see Takayuki Takeuchi. 2003. “The Relationship between Big Businesses and 
Government in Hong Kong SAR (香港における財閥と政治の関係)” Doshisha policy and 
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the democratization of the Legislative Council election with the Democrats(13) following 
the military crackdown on pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square(1989). But 
they preferred stability rather than autonomy or separation from Mainland China, and in 
various ways worked to maintain their ties with the PRC central government, with an 
eye to advancing their investment in Mainland China supporting the Drafting 
Committee for the Basic Law, and assisting in other processes that were preparatory to 
the handover of Hong Kong. Considering these realities, it is highly unlikely that the 
PRC central government will be willing to change the status quo in the Hong Kong 
SAR. 
 
The Status of Hong Kong SAR in the international community and 
integration with Mainland China 
The PRC did not integrate the economic and legal systems of Hong Kong with those 
of Mainland China, and did it permit the Hong Kong SAR to join the international 
community. Indeed the current status of Hong Kong SAR is that of a local government 
of the PRC, and one that has only ‘incomplete autonomy’, and is controlled by the PRC 
central government. Usually, territories or political entities that have a distinct 
international personality are separated from the suzerain state or from the mainland. 
Their political attributes, including independence, should depend on the free will of the 
local residents; otherwise colonial rule cannot be justified.  
The PRC government considered Hong Kong under British rule to be a part of the 
PRC’s territory that was occupied illegally, and claimed the retrocession of Hong Kong 
in complete disregard of the will of Hong Kong residents( 14 ). Under the PRC 
                                                                                                                                                  
management review(同志社政策科学研究). Vol.4 No.1 (in Japanese) 
(13) For detail, see Kazuhito Nakazono(中園和仁). 1998. Sino-British Negotiations on the Status 
of Hong Kong (香港返還交渉：民主化をめぐる攻防). Tokyo: Kokusai Shoin (国際書院), 
pp.161. (in Japanese) 
(14) Ibid., the second paragraph, the second section ‘British colonial rule (イギリスの植民地統
治)’ 
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Constitution, the status of Hong Kong SAR differs only slightly from that of the 
Chinese provinces.  
Why does the lack of autonomy of Hong Kong not have a negative effect on the 
international personality of Hong Kong? The first reason is that dependent territories are 
subject to more limitations than sovereign states (see Table 1). Only a few international 
organizations on the socio-economic files of the United Nations allow the accession of 
dependent territories such as Hong Kong. The WTO is one such organization. But Hong 
Kong is allowed to gain access indirectly to the IMF and the World Bank via the PRC 
central government, even though Hong Kong has its own currency, the Hong Kong 
Dollar. The second reason is that the United Kingdom, the former suzerain state of 
Hong Kong, and the United States, hope that Hong Kong will keep the status quo and 
remain separate from the Mainland. The United Kingdom has signed the Sino-British 
Joint Declaration, by which China and Britain promise to maintain the status quo of 
Hong Kong, and also sponsored Hong Kong for access to GATT in 1986 (15). The United 
Sates supported Hong Kong’s accession to APEC simultaneously with the access of the 
PRC and Taiwan. The United Kingdom and the United States are appreciative of the 
rule of the Hong Kong SAR government and of the importance of Hong Kong economy. 
Table 1. The accession to inter-governmental organizations by Hong Kong SAR 
 Participating as a part of  
a PRC delegation 
Semi-accession Accession 
Universal IBRD(World Bank), IMF, ILO,WHO, 
FAO, IAEA, ITU, UTU, WIPO, 




WTO, BIS,  
World Meteorological
Organization 
Regional  ESCAP APEC, ADB 
*：Organization not within the UN System 
Source: Website of the Hong Kong SAR government 
 
                                                  
(15) For details, see Takayuki Takeuchi (竹内孝之). 2001. "The Political Meaning and Barriers 
preventing Cross-Taiwan Straits Economic Integration.(両岸経済統合の政治的意義と障壁)", 
Modern China (現代中国) no.75: 161-178. 
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The integration between Hong Kong SAR and Mainland China may perhaps be 
analyzed as a case of integration between or among sovereign states. But there is 
another key element, namely the will of Hong Kong SAR. In international relations, 
integration means that each sovereign state releases part of its sovereignty (or transfers 
it to a supranational institution) as an expression of their intent to integrate the 
functioning or organization of states, or as a means of abolishing the obstacles and 
borders that hinder transnational activities. Hong Kong SAR is a local government of 
the PRC without any sovereignty, and the borders and institutions of Hong Kong SAR 
can be abolished or changed by the PRC central government. Moreover Hong Kong 
SAR has no democratic means, such as a referendum, by which the people’s opinion 
might be expressed. In these circumstances, it is difficult to determine the will of the 
Hong Kong SAR.  
However, the PRC central government has no intention of integrating Hong Kong into 
Mainland China. So the demand on the Hong Kong side, and especially that of the Hong 
Kong ethnic Chinese capitalists who are the PRC’s political partners in Hong Kong 
SAR, is an important key factor promoting integration. It is easy for the political system 
in Hong Kong to reflect the intentions of the business community. And it is difficult for 
the PRC central government to ignore the opinion of ethnic Chinese capitalists, 
regardless of whether they wish to promote or retard the process of integration. In the 
current political system of the Hong Kong SAR. the demand from the business 
community promotes the integration with the Mainland, regardelles the will of the Hong 
Kong residents.  
 
Feasibility of integration between Hong Kong and Mainland China 
The Basic Law of the SAR, established in 1990, did not assume the existence of 
economic integration between Hong Kong and Mainland China. In the late1990s, 
arguments on the formation of an FTA became popular in East Asia. FTA is merely the 
first step towards economic integration. What kind of linkages exist between the issues 
that predominate among East Asian countries and those that link Hong Kong with the 
Mainland? Section 2 reviews economic cooperation under ‘One Country, Two Systems’ 
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formula and considers the dynamics of this cooperation. Section 3 examines the legal 
feasibility of integration under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula, and Section 4 
examines the remaining issue, namely democracy. 
Political integration can be classified into integration of political fields (diplomacy 
and defense) and the establishment and development of supranational institutions. 
Since the PRC central government is responsible for issues of diplomacy and defense 
that relate to Hong Kong SAR, these are matters that we need not consider further. So 
far as the establishment and development of supranational institutions is concerned, the 
socio-economic context in which supranational institutions may be established in Hong 
Kong will be discussed in Section 3. 
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2. Trigger of the policy change towards an FTA in 
Hong Kong 
 
This section examines the bilateral relationship between the Mainland and Hong 
Kong, and the external, East Asian environment, and discusses which of these was the 
key factor influencing Hong Kong’s decision to negotiate for membership of a Free 
Trade Agreement. 
 
Economic cooperation between Hong Kong and the Mainland 
The Basic Law of Hong Kong SAR prohibits the departments of the State Council 
(central government) and local governments in Mainland China from intervening in the 
Hong Kong SAR (Article 22). But, in Mainland China, some of local authority 
(government and Communist party) leaders also hold posts in central government. 
Moreover personnel exchanges frequently occur between local and central government. 
In this context, the State Council has established the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs 
Office (HMO) to monitor the relations between the departments of central government 
and local governments and the Hong Kong SAR. Senior officers of the HMO have 
participated in all of the schemes for economic cooperation between Hong Kong and the 
Mainland. But they are sometimes criticized for hindering rather than promoting 
economic cooperation. 
Before the handover, the few areas of cooperation between Hong Kong and the 
Mainland included the following:- 
 Hong Kong/Guangdong Cross Border Liaison System (1982 onwards) 
 Hong Kong-Guangdong Environmental Protection Liaison Group (1990~99)  
Joint Working Group on Sustainable Development and Environmental Protection (1999 onwards) 
 British and Mainland Cross-Boundary Major Infrastructure Coordinating Committee (1994~97)  
Hong Kong and Mainland Cross-Boundary Major Infrastructure Coordinating Committee (1997 
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onwards) 
In these examples of cooperation, except for the British and Mainland Cross-Boundary 
Major Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, the partner representing the Mainland 
has been Guangdong Province. From the point of view of Mainland China, cooperation 
between the two territories is merely an issue on the periphery. 
After handover, the situation underwent little change, the two main areas of 
cooperation being:-  
 HK/Guangdong Co-operation Joint Conference (1998 onwards) 
 Mainland and Hong Kong SAR Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade 
                         (1999 onwards) 
The Hong Kong/Guangdong Co-operation Joint Conference follows an aggressive 
policy with regard to the administration of customs and immigration. It has expand the 
operation time of customs and immigration procedures (its final goal is 24 hours 
operation) and has established the ‘co-location of immigration and customs facilities’ 
(一地兩檢) (16). Moreover the State Council’s HMO, a body that is under the jurisdiction 
of the Chinese central government, has joined the Conference, and has assisted it in the 
implementation of its policies. So far, the Conference has discussed only local issues 
relating to Shenzhen City and Guangdong Province. 
The Mainland and Hong Kong SAR Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade is 
the first project for comprehensive economic cooperation between two territories. It was 
started by the Ministry of Trade and Economic Cooperation (currently the Ministry of 
Commerce) of the State Council of China and the Commerce and Industry Bureau 
(currently the Commerce, Industry and Technology Bureau) of the Hong Kong SAR. 
The Joint Commission holds an annual conference, and has four working groups, 
respectively on ‘Trade’, ‘Investment’, ‘Contract Works and Labour Management’ (17), 
                                                  
(16) ‘co-location of immigration and customs facilities’(一地兩檢) doesn’t mean the exchange or 
linkage of data base of Hong Kong SAR and Mainland immigration. 
(17) This working group changed the name to Working Group on Economic Corporation, at the 
third meeting of joint committee. 
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and ‘Technology Trade and Treaty/Law’.  The meetings of each of the working groups 
are more frequent than those of the Joint Commission. But the Joint Commission has no 
standing organization, and the governments of the two territories only exchange 
opinions and information, and sometimes harmonize their policies. The Joint 
Commission has not proposed a new common policy, nor has it discussed economic 
integration.  
In fact, the Hong Kong SAR government has not been willing to engage in economic 
cooperation with Shenzhen City and Guangdong Province. After the 1980s, economic 
relations between Hong Kong and Guangdong Province were mutually complementary. 
But, recently, Hong Kong and other cities in Guangdong Province have become 
competitors (18). It should be noted, moreover, that the development of transportation 
and of the logistic infrastructure in Guangdong Province may reduce the 
competitiveness of Hong Kong as a regional hub. What is more, Shenzhen City is 
aggressively upgrading its industry, and is scrambling in competition with Hong Kong 
to attract hi-tech human resources and foreign direct investment. Furthermore, the 
retailing businesses in these two cities compete strongly to attract Hong Kong 
consumers. Shenzhen City government insistes to implement cross-border passage for 
24 hours, but the government of Hong Kong SAR, egged on by retailers in Hong Kong, 
has considered introducing a ‘land departure tax’ (19).  
 
East Asian Regionalism 
The main trigger for economic integration should be sought outside of Hong Kong 
and the PRC. 
                                                                                                                                                  
“Third Meeting of the Mainland and HKSAR Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade” 
Press Release of Hong Kong SAR Government. December 5, 2001. 
(18) Joseph Yu-Shek Cheng (鄭宇碩) and King-Lun Ngok(岳經綸). The Interactions Between 
Hong Kong, Mainland China and Taiwan and Their Impacts-May 1998-May 1999(香港與両岸
互動及其相互影響：香港回歸兩年來的觀察與評估). Taipei:Cross-Strait Interflow 
Foundation(遠景基金會)., pp.42. (in Chinese) 
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The Hong Kong SAR government has shown a negative attitude towards any regional 
trade agreement, including proposals for an FTA. New Zealand government proposed 
negotiations for the formation of an FTA with Hong Kong, but could make no progress 
with the Hong Kong SAR government. Moreover on a visit to Japan in March 2000, 
Chief Executive Tung, when asked about the possibility of an FTA with Japan,  said 
that he gives priority to multilateral trade negotiations within the WTO. (20). Further, 
Joseph Yam, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong Monetary Authority, speaking in 
November 2000, said that “regionalism isn’t the solution for the problems created by 
globalization. At the same time, regional cooperation sets a regional standard, which is 
not appropriate for a global standard. So regionalism is very dangerous” (21). 
Except for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), East Asian countries did not give 
thought to any type of economic integration until the early 1990s (22). So far as the 
region’s major economies were concerned, only Japan, South Korea, the PRC, Taiwan, 
and Hong Kong, had not signed an FTA. Since the major export market of these 
countries is the United States, they have no need to consider East Asian regionalism. 
But the development of the EU and the change in U.S. trade policy towards promoting 
FTAs such as the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and  the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA), and towards transforming APEC into an FTA, provided the 
stimulus for the formation of an AFTA, the East Asian Economic Caucus, and later also 
led to the grouping ASEAN+3 (23). Meanwhile Japan, South Korea and Singapore 
energetically sought to sign a bilateral FTA in the late 1990s. The PRC also proposed an 
FTA, to counter ASEAN, in November 2000. At that time, the ASEAN side suggested 
the formation of ASEAN+3, but in the following year agreed to begin with ASEAN+1, 
an FTA project that links ASEAN with the PRC.  
Hong Kong, however, is excluded from the ASEAN+3 FTA. And Hong 
                                                                                                                                                  
(19) Ibid., pp.44. 
(20) Mainichi Daily News, 17 March, 2000 (in Japanese) 
(21) “Communist China needs FTA with ASEAN(中共將東協合組自由貿易區).” Commercial 
Times (工商時報)(Taipei). November 3, 2001. (Chinese) 
(22) APEC is not scheme for economic integration. 
(23) ASEAN+3 FTA initiative was declared in the meeting of ASEAN in November 2000. 
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Kong-Mainland China relations run the risk of being sidelined compared with 
relationships between the PRC and other members of ASEAN+3. Some commentators 
in Hong Kong insist that the SAR’s free trade policy means that there is little merit in 
Hong Kong signing and negotiating FTA with other countries (24). In any case, the Hong 
Kong SAR government hesitated to negotiate an FTA with Japan in March 2000, New 
Zealand in August 2000, and Mainland China after the Asian economic crisis of 1997. 
In all of these cases, the major obstacle was the Hong KongSAR government’s bias 
against joining an FTA. 
It cannot be denied that the major developed countries have reduced their tariff  
rates. However the merit of an FTA lies not just in the reduction of tariff rates, but in 
more dynamic aspects, such as the promotion of cross-border activities by companies, 
and the improvement of productivity. The formation of an FTA should be accompanied 
by progress on matters such as taxation, investment, customs procedures, government 
procurement, and the cross certification of standards, all of which improve the 
dynamism of an FTA (25). It follows that the isolation of Hong Kong from regional 
projects, including FTAs, may impair the status of Hong Kong as a center for 
international trade and investment(26). In that sense, an FTA is already inevitable so far 
as Hong Kong is concerned.  
 
China’s accession to the WTO 
Accession to the WTO caused China to change its investment policy with regard to 
foreign companies. The PRC defines Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan as “special 
domestic” areas under local legislation. But WTO rules require the abolition of all 
preferential policy to foreign companies including these three territories, all of which 
                                                  
(24) Bank of China (Hong Kong) op. cit.  
and Yun-wing, Sung op. cit., pp.155-156 
(25) Ippei Yamazawa(山澤逸平). 2001. “Asia-Pacific Regionalism and Japanese Strategy (アジ
ア太平洋地域主義と日本の戦略).” International Affairs(国際問題). No.494. May 2001, 
pp7-9 
(26) Bank of China (Hong Kong) op. cit.  
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are also members of the WTO. After accession to the WTO, Zhang Mingqing, at that 
time the spokesman for the Taiwan affairs office of the State Council of China said “the 
treatments of Taiwanese companies will depend on WTO rules” (27). However Zhu 
Rongqi, who at that time was Prime Minister of China, said “the preferential treatment 
of Hong Kong companies is a domestic issue and will be continued in the future” (28). It 
seems that the PRC did not take the WTO rule seriously, for the central government of 
China announced new preferential treatment of foreign companies, to promote its 
Western Development plan (29). But a PRC officer emphasized the WTO rules with 
respect to Taiwanese companies, so Hong Kong companies showed that they considered 
an FTA as an alternative to preferential treatment.  
Under the WTO system, Mainland China and Hong Kong SAR are respectively a 
“mainland customs territory” and a “separated customs territory” of the PRC, with 
equal membership of the WTO (Article 24(a) and (h) of GATT 1947). The Basic Law 
of the SAR also authorizes the SAR government to participate in a Regional Trade 
Agreement (RTA). In fact the formation of an FTA between Mainland China and the 
Hong Kong SAR would not encounter any obstacle in the WTO system, although it 
would certainly constitute a very rare case for customs territories within the same 
sovereign state to sign an FTA.  
Nevertheless the formation of an FTA remains a sensitive issue for the PRC. The 
central government of China considers an FTA to be the equivalent of an 
“international” treaty, which should be reported to the RTA Committee of the WTO. 
Moreover the Taiwan government and the ruling Taiwanese party, the Democratic 
Progress Party, are pursuing a ‘Strengthen the Base and Go West’(強本西進) policy, 
                                                  
(27) “Taiwan Affairs Office, State Council: Triple linkage across the Taiwan Strait does not need 
the help of a WTO scheme (國台辦：兩岸三通緝無需借助WTO架構解決)” Commercial 
Times (工商時報)(Taipei). November 1, 2001. (Chinese) 
(28) “Zhu Rongji: Preferential treatment for Hong Kong companies will be continued (朱鎔基：
繼續優惠港商).” Mingpao Daily News (明報) (Hong Kong). November 11, 2001.  
(29) State Council, People’s Republic of China. 2000. Circular of the State Council on Policies 
and Measures Pertaining to the Development of the Western Region (国务院关于实施西部大
开发若干政策措施的通知国務院関於実施西部大開発若干政策措施的通知)’ October 26. 
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and aim to equalize the cross-straits relationship by signing an FTA. Thus the central 
government of China refers to an FTA with Hong Kong SAR as ‘an arrangement 
similar to an FTA’ (30) and in the later negotiations with the government of the Hong 
Kong SAR for the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), it emphasized 
the compliance of an FTA with the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula.  
 
Summary 
The trigger that pushed the government of the Hong Kong SAR government into 
negotiating an FTA with mainland China was the PRC’s accession to the WTO and the 
favorable nature of the international environment, a factor that influenced other East 
Asian countries, too. The government of the Hong Kong SAR ignored allegations from 
Guangdong Province and Shenzhen city that it was delaying progress towards 
cooperation before negotiating the CEPA with the Mainland. This suggests that the key 
trigger for economic integration is not to be found within the current nexus of economic 
relationships between Mainland China and Hong Kong.  
Inter-territorial relations within the Chinese Area(31) as a whole have depended on the 
separation of economic and political issues. But an FTA is a kind of trade treaty, and so 
far as China is concerned combines economic and trade issues with other politically 
sensitive problems. In any case, the Hong Kong SAR and the central government of 
China have begun to use the FTA as an alternative for preferential treatment.  
 
                                                  
(30) “FTA: Central authority is studying the set-up” (自貿區:中央拍版研設).”Wenweipo(文匯
報) (香港). December 20, 2001 
(31) Chinese Area is including Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwn. 
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3. Integration under “One Country, Two Systems”  
 
How far can integration be further developed under the current “One Country, Two 
Systems” formula? And are there differences between the integration of territories 
within a sovereign state and integration between sovereign states?  
Major obstacles that hinder economic integration include concerns over intensifying 
competition and changes in the economic environment. Béla Balassa has classified 
types of economic integration by fields and has arranged them in order of increasing 
difficulty. The categories are: [1]trade policy and customs, [2]movement of productive 
elements, such as labor and capital, and [3]economic policy, including finance, 
monetary policy and currencies. Category [1] includes FTA formation and the 
establishment of customs unions( 32 ). The implementation of Category [2] after 
completing Category [1], in other words a customs union, means the realization of a 
common market. Balassa’s Category [3] implies the creation of a economic union after 
the achievement of common market ([1] and [2]). Economic policies often need the 
formulation of new laws  and/or amendments of existing laws. In fact the integration 
of economic policy, including decision-making and the implementation of policy, needs 
harmonization of the legal systems and integration of the legislative process. The last 
step of economic integration, ‘complete economic union’, requires a complex 
harmonization of policy that is impossible without supra-national organization. Balassa 
also suggests the possibility of a transfer from supra-national organization to federal 
government following complete economic union (33). 
The author considers the current Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR as a given 
condition, and considers as the only dynamic element some degree of change in 
‘economic reasonableness’.  First, the central government perceives the need to pursue 
                                                  
(32) A preferential trade agreement might be sorted out at the previous level of the FTA, but a 
PTA is prohibited by GATT/WTO in general, except for cases of PTAs between or among 
developing countries.  
(33) B・Balassa op.cit., pp.358 
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a policy of ‘economic reasonableness’ and has the political will to maintain the ‘Two 
Systems’, or the original system of Hong Kong that differs from that of Mainland China 
(as mentioned above, under ‘Sovereignty and two economic systems’, Chapter 1). 
Second, the SAR Basic Law also embraces issues of human rights and democracy in 
Hong Kong, so any amendment of the SAR Basic Law could cause trouble in the Hong 
Kong SAR Legislative Council. The central government is aware that such a situation 
could damage the overseas reputation of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ approach, and 
could impair Hong Kong’s economic advantage. 
The following analysis examines the possibility of integration and the consistency of 
integration with the SAR Basic Law, and considers each of the main economic strands, 
topic by topic. 
 
Integration of trade policy and customs  
Hong Kong, at the time a free port under British colonial rule, became a member of 
GATT as a separate customs territory (34) in 1986, and has been a founding member of 
the WTO since 1995. Hong Kong, even after handover in 1997, does not collect 
customs (Article 114), maintains the status of a separate customs territory and 
participates in international organizations and trade agreements, including preferential 
trade arrangements (PTA) (35) (Article 116).  
An FTA is a kind of PTA to which the exact conditions of GATT/WTO rules apply. 
Hong Kong is entitled to sign an FTA by itself. But the Basic Law prohibits the 
collection of customs dues except for those on tobacco and liquor, and Hong Kong 
                                                  
(34) A territory with enough autonomy on unique customs and related economic policies can gain 
access to GATT/WTO. At first, it was assumed that colonies could gain access to GATT as 
separated territories, but in fact they gained access to GATT immediately after independence, 
as sovereign countries. So there are only three examples of customs territories with access to 
WTO in the Chinese Area, namely Taiwan, Hong Kong SAR and Macao SAR. For more, see 
Takayuki Takeuchi op. cit. 
(35) A of PTA stands for ‘Arrangement’(in Chinese ‘按排’), not for ‘Agreement’ (‘協定’). A of 
CEPA also stands for ‘Arrangement’.  
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cannot join a customs union, because Hong Kong has to maintain its own customs 
system. 
Before the CEPA became a subject of discussion, there was some debate over 
whether or not it would be feasible to create an FTA consisting of Hong Kong and 
Mainland China. Sung Yun Wing believed that Mainland China would not be able to 
benefit from the formation of a Hong Kong Mainland FTA (36). In fact there is no serious 
obstacle hindering free trade in products between Hong Kong and Mainland China. 
Most of Hong Kong’s manufacturing has already moved to the Pearl River Delta area of 
Guangdong Province, an industrial migration that has contributed to the economic 
development of Mainland China. On the other hand, Hong Kong has failed to advance 
its own industry, has experienced a hollowing out of domestic manufacturing, and has 
come to depend on factories in Mainland China. Hu Angang has insisted that a 
Northeast Asia FTA, including Mainland China and Hong Kong, would have no 
negative impact on the Chinese economy. A fundamental problem is the consistency and 
transparency in customs administration in China. But the average of the effective rates 
of customs in Mainland China is only 2-3%, which is quite different from the nominal 
rate of customs (17.9%) in 1998 (37). 
In an FTA based on trade in services, established by the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS) in 1995, Hong Kong could offer concessions for Mainland China 
and other countries and customs territories, and could realize mutual benefits. The 
CEPA contains an FTA based on GATS rules, and also includes reference to the 
promotion of trade and investment and the movement of people. Hong Kong has 
already signed many bilateral investment agreements with third countries (38), and the 
                                                  
(36) Yun-wing Sung. op. cit. 
(37) Hu, Angang(胡鞍钢). 2001. “Establishing a Four-Party Free Trade Zone among China, 
China's HK SAR, Japan and South Korea (建立中国、中国香港特区、日本、韩国 三国四方
自由贸易区设想).” International Economic Review (国际经济评论). 3-4, 2001: 17-20.  
(38) Hong Kong has signed BIT with Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and major 
members of EU. See Department of Justice. 2006. List of Investment Promotion and Protection 
Agreements. Hong Kong: Department of Justice, Hong Kong SAR government. 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/table2ti.htm (accessed June 16, 2006) 
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movement of people within an FTA doesn’t imply complete freedom of movement, but 
can mean merely economic deregulation of the movement of labor and talent. In this 
sense, therefore, the CEPA stipulations do not conflict with the Basic Law of the SAR. 
Moreover in the CEPA negotiations, the will of the Hong Kong people has been 
recognized as a major factor. In the autumn of 1997, just after the economic crisis in 
East and Southeast Asia, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation of 
the People’s Republic of China (MOFTEC) commissioned a study on ways in which an 
FTA could assist the Hong Kong economy, but the Hong Kong SAR government at that 
time was unwilling to enter into an FTA, and the idea was dropped (39). In early 2000, 
the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce (HKGCC) published a summary of a 
report on the impact of the PRC’s accession to the WTO and the resulting effect on 
business fields in Hong Kong. This report proposed an FTA with the Mainland as an 
alternative to the provision of preferential treatment of foreign capital. (40) HKGCC 
submitted the report to the Chief Executive, Tung Chee Hwa, and on several occasions 
also lobbied the senior officials of the PRC central government in an attempt to obtain 
their support for the proposal(41). As the result of the lobbying, Chief Executive Tung 
officially proposed the formation of an FTA and the PRC central government promised 
to support the plan for supporting the Hong Kong economy, regardless of the resulting 
benefits or losses to the economy of Mainland China(42). 
                                                  
(39) “FTA will be signed next year at the earliest (自貿區最快明年設立).” Wenweipo(文匯報) 
(Hong Kong). December 19, 2001 
(40) Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce(香港總商會). 2000. China's Entry into the 
WTO and the Impact on Hong Kong Business: A Business Perspective (從商界角度看 中國加
入世貿對港商的影響), pp.12. (Chinese Edition) 
And “Annex III the feasibility of Mainland and Hong Kong Regional Trade Agreement (附件三 
中國內地與香港特區訂立地區性貿易協定的可能性)” Ibid. 
(41) “Hong Kong and the Mainland need an FTA(香港内地宜自由貿易區)” Wenweipo(文匯報) 
(Hong Kong) . November 23, 2001.  
(42) “Jian Zhemin: Central authority will help Hong Kong to break out from recession(江澤民:中
央將助港脱困).” Wenweipo(文匯報) (Hong Kong). December 20, 2001.  
and “Central authority attempts to strengthen the economic status of Hong Kong” Wenweipo(文
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Deregulation of the mobility of productive factors 
Productive factors mean labor and capital. The latter of these raises currency issues 
which will be examined in the next paragraph.  
The mobility of labor is not only an economic issue, but also gives rise to social 
issues. Large differences in economic development or in income can cause mass 
migration, which might mean a search for the best allocation of labor, but also serious 
social problems. In the case of Europe, completely free mobility of people (abolition of 
immigration controls and customs houses) was realized by the Schengen Convention, as 
an issue separate from economic integration. A major challenge in the integration of the 
European market is harmonization and mutual recognition of products, educational 
qualifications and professional specifications. Similar issues could well develop 
between Hong Kong and Mainland China, too. 
Hong Kong residents may easily visit China with a ‘Mainland Travel Permit for Hong 
Kong and Macao Residents’(港澳居民來往內地通行證). In late 2004, the Hong Kong 
SAR government introduced the ‘e-Channel’(e-道), which is an ‘Automated Passenger 
(Vehicle) Clearance System’(旅 客(車輛司機)自助出入境檢查系統) for holders of 
new Hong Kong ID cards that incorporate IC chips. Further easing of cross-border 
travel, including for example, free passage for 24 hours, is also being considered.  
So far as immigration is concerned, Hong Kong SAR limits the number of 
immigrants from the Mainland to 150 people a day. But, in 2004, the total number of 
immigrants from the Mainland amounted to only 38,100, only 69% of the total 
allocation for the year (43). The Hong Kong SAR government has started some projects 
for (44)accepting engineers of hi-tech industries and scientists from the Mainland.  
                                                                                                                                                  
匯報) (Hong Kong). December 20, 2001. 
(43) Information Services Department of Hong Kong SAR Government. 2005. Hong Kong Year 
Book 2004. Hong Kong: Information Services Department of Hong Kong SAR Government. 
http://www.yearbook.gov.hk/2004/en/20_03.htm (accessed June 27, 2006) 
(44) The first scheme was the Admission of Talents Scheme (引進内地優秀人才計劃) which 
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CEPA and further similar future projects will promote the mutual recognition of 
products and professional specifications. But the unlimited mobility of labor across the 
border is not really feasible. 
 
Financial and Monetary Integration  
Both financial and monetary integration have strong linkages with sovereignty. Full 
financial integration is not yet realized even in the EU. In any case, the Basic Law of the 
Hong Kong SAR virtually prohibits financial integration between Hong Kong SAR and 
the People’s Republic of China (Article 106).  
There are two types of monetary integration. One is the Euro type, in which a single 
currency is introduced, and a central bank (in the case of the EU the European Central 
Bank) established as a supra-national institution with authority over the central banks of 
the member states. Another type is the mutually agreed and cross-border circulation of 
currencies. The Basic Law prevents only the first of these types of monetary integration 
(Articles 111 and 113).  
Some economists and business leaders have been puzzled by the continued existence 
of the Hong Kong Dollar, and believe that it ought to be integrated with the Renminbi 
(the currency of the PRC, hereinafter RMB).  
 Milton Friedman predicted that the PRC central government would abolish the 
Hong Kong Dollar within two years of the handover, believing that the PRC would 
feel uncomfortable over the existence of two currencies within a single sovereign 
                                                                                                                                                  
was introduced in 1999. Subsequently, an Admission of Talents Scheme (輸入內地專業人才計
劃) was begun, in 2001. These two schemes were combined and renamed as the Admission 
Scheme for Mainland Talents and Professionals (輸入內地人才計劃) in 2003.  
The Admission of Mainland Students Graduated from the University Grants Committee 
(UGC)-Funded Institutions in Hong Kong (輸入在本港大學教育委員會資助的院校畢業的內
地學生) has been effective since 2001. 
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state, and, because the RMB was cheaper than the Hong Kong Dollar (45). Friedman 
assumed that the PRC would strive to convert the RMB into as hard a currency as 
possible, and would then replace the Hong Kong dollar with the RMB.  
 Steven N.S. Chueng, whose position is close to Friedman’s, predicted that the RMB 
would become a major currency within a year after becoming a hard currency, and 
in a speech made in Macao in November 2001, insisted that “Hong Kong and 
Macao should abolish the Hong Kong Dollar and the Macao Pataca, and use the 
RMB ”when he made a (46). 
 In June 2006, David Li Kwok Po, the Chairman and President of the East Asia 
Bank and a non-official member of the Executive Council of the Hong Kong SAR 
government, said “the Hong Kong Dollar is available until 2047, but most people in 
Hong Kong will be using the RMB by around 2020” (47). The EAB is the largest 
bank established by ethnic Chinese capital in Hong Kong, 
In fact, there is good evidence to show that the PRC central government is not 
obsessed with the RMB as a symbol of sovereignty. In 1981, the Shenzhen City 
government considered introducing a local currency that would be available only in 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ), their aim being to prevent the circulation of 
the Hong Kong Dollar within Shenzhen SEZ. Moreover in 1984, Deng Xiaoping and 
the State Council of China for a while authorized the Shenzhen SEZ currency plan and 
even decided the designs of the bills and coins that would be used (48). But, at the final 
                                                  
(45) Nigel Holloway 'Paradise Lost: Friedman predicts China will scrap Hong Kong Dollar' "Far 
Eastern Economic Review" February 23, 1995, p.55. 
(46) “Steven Chueng says “Leave Hong Kong Dollar, Use RMB” (張五常：棄港元用人民幣)”. 
Hong Kong Economic Daily (香港経済日報), 15 November, 2001 (in Chinese)  
(47) “Hong Kong can be off-shore RMB center. David Li says “RMB will be used by all of Hong 
Kong people with 20 years” (港可離岸人民幣中心 李國寶：20年内港人全部使用人民幣)”, 
Hong Kong Commercial Daily(香港商報), June 3, 2002 (in Chinese) 
(48) “A valuable document on “SEZ currency” was rescued while city history was edited(編修市
誌搶救一批珍貴重資料 “特区貨幣”史実際公諸于世)” Daily Sunshine(晶報) (Sheng Zhen), 
15 May, 2002 
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moment they abandoned the plan. They hesitated only because to go ahead would have 
made the Chinese monetary system too complex, for the SEZ currency would have been 
the third currency to be introduced, following the RMB and the Foreign Exchange 
Certificate (外汇兑换券).  
The government of the Hong Kong SAR is relatively conservative as regards the 
continued existence of the Hong Kong Dollar. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
(hereinafter called as HKMA) once explained that the existence of the Hong Kong 
Dollar would not be threatened, even if the RMB were to become a hard currency in the 
future. However the HKMA seems to be positively against the simultaneous circulation 
of the RMB and Hong Kong Dollar, and is developing a new settlement system with the 
People’s Bank of China.  
On the whole, majority opinion in Hong Kong expects that the raison d'etre of the 
Hong Kong Dollar will be called into question after the RMB becomes a hard currency. 
Some observers consider the Hong Kong Dollar to be indispensable, for the RMB has 
been not yet been a hard currency. Except for the HKMA, the opinions quoted above 
agree that there is a linkage between the existence of the Hong Kong Dollar and the 
convertibility of the RMB. The critical question is when will the RMB become a hard 
currency. The time could well be earlier than 2047, 50 years after the handover in 1997. 
Since the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR prohibits the abolition of the Hong 
Kong Dollar, it will be impossible to introduce a single currency for the whole of the 
PRC. But Article 111 of the Basic Law orders deposits for the reserve fund to issue 
Hong Kong Dollars, but does not refer to the denomination(49). The Hong Kong Dollar 
can be pegged with the RMB in the future, although the RMB would be expected to 
function as an alternative to the Hong Kong Dollar, which means the RMB being 
pegged with the US Dollar, for the stability of Hong Kong as an international financial 
center (50). 
                                                  
(49) In the case of Macao, the Hong Kong Dollar is the reserve currency for the Macao Pataca 
(Article 108, Basic Law of Macao SAR). 
(50) Kazumasa Iwata(岩田一政). 1998. “Economics of Keynes: The External Aspect (ケインズ
の経済学：対外的インプリケーション)”. Financial Review Vol.45:105-122. Tokyo: Policy 
 27
But using the peg on its own does not mean the realization of monetary integration. 
The key element for monetary integration is mutual currency circulation and the legal 
support for it. In parts of Mainland China such as Shenzhen and Macao, there is 
currency substitution by the Hong Kong Dollar.  
Table 5. Money Supply in the Macao SAR (Unit：million Macao Pataca) 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
M1* 5483.7 5581.4 5363.2 4945.4 5916.7 6350.8 8789.5 13440.7 12788.9
 Macao Pataca 3574.7 3456.8 3670.7 3178.5 3522.7 3931.2 4871.7 6285.2 6848.4
 Hong Kong Dollar 1855.2 2064.8 1652.3 1698.6 2329.6 2361.8 3533.3 6746.1 5398.7
 Other currencies 53.7 59.8 40.3 68.4 64.4 57.8 384.5 409.4 541.8
M2** 78357.5 80700.2 86096.3 84917.9 91550.0 98959.3 111090.1 120947 135659.8
 Macao Pataca 24179.8 24863.5 27950.1 23220.6 26107.1 27544.1 29668.5 31369.7 36688.2
 Hong Kong Dollar 41599.0 42860.8 44122.6 44506.4 46906.7 51224.2 59440.4 66214.0 70145.4
 Other currencies 12578.8 12975.9 14023.6 17190.9 18536.2 20191.0 21981.2 23363.3 28826.2
*M1: Cash+ordinary & checking deposit **M2: M1+fixed-term deposit 
Source：Bureau of statistics and censuses, Macao SAR 
http://www.dsec.gov.mo//chinese/indicator/c_mon_indicator_1.html (accessed 27 June 2006) 
 
The circulation of the Hong Kong Dollar in Macao accounts for between 30 and 40% 
of money supply (M1), or over a half of M2 (see Table5). The government of the Macao 
SAR at one time tried to exclude the Hong Kong Dollar from the settlement of business 
dealings in Macao, but the attempt was in vain(51). The Hong Kong Dollar has reduced 
                                                                                                                                                  
Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan. (in Japanese) 
http://www.mof.go.jp/f-review/r45/r_45_105_122.pdf (accessed July 13, 2006) 
Iwata considers RMB pegging with US Dollar difficult, because of the high inflation rate in 
Mainland China.  
(51) Ricardo Chi Sen Siu (粛志成). 1999. A Theory of Multiple Currency: Including a Discussion 
on the Theory and Strategy of the Currencies under “One Country, Two Systems(多元貨幣論：
兼論“一國両制”下的貨幣理論與策略)”. Macao: Macao Foundation(澳門基金會), pp78. (in 
 28
the raison d'etre of the Pataca as the legal currency of Macao. Meanwhile, the supply 
(M1) of other currencies has increased significantly since 2003. A possible reason for 
this is that the introduction of the Individual Visit Scheme (港澳自由行) under the 
CEPA led to an increase in the number of tourists visiting Macao from Mainland China, 
and the consumption in Macao by such tourists, using the RMB. 
Approximately 30% of all Hong Kong Dollars circulate in the Mainland, while a 
considerable amount of RMB circulates in Hong Kong, although there are no official 
data for this, and there is no estimate of the quantity(52). In the Hong Kong SAR, the 
Individual Visit Scheme has also promoted  consumption by tourists visiting from 
Mainland China using RMB. The mutual circulation of the RMB and the Hong Kong 
Dollar is not supported legally. Even before 2005, when the RMB was pegged with a 
basket of currencies and revalued, the difference of rates between the Hong Kong Dollar 
and the RMB was only 6% (see Table 6). 
Table 6. Rates among the Renminbi, the Hong Kong Dollar, and the Macao Pataca  
(before 2005) 
 RMB HK$ Macao Pataca 
1US$ 8.3Yuan (managed floating system) 7.8HK$ (pegged) (8MOP) 
100HK$ (106.4Yuan)  103.2MOP (pegged) 
 
It would in fact be easy to support the mutual circulation of the Hong Kong Dollar 
and the RMB with legislation, which would simply confirm the current situation and 
which would not necessarily conflict with the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR. In 
the past, there have been some examples of monetary union (53) which relied on the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Chinese) 
(52) According to the People’s Daily, between 50 and 70 billion RMB was circulating in Hong 
Kong in August 2003, cited from a report of UBS Warburg. 
“Hong Kong: Where's the 'Outlet' for RMB 70 Billion?” People’s Daily English Edition. August 
14, 2003. 
http://english.people.com.cn/200308/14/eng20030814_122302.shtml (accessed June 26, 2006). 
(53) Soko Tanaka. 2002. Euro: The impact and its whereabouts (Yuro:Sono shougeki to yukue), 
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legal support of the mutual circulation of currencies and the settlement system between 
the central banks – arrangements which failed to continue over the long term, because 
each state possessed sovereignty over its own currency and its own financial policies. 
However, Hong Kong SAR and Mainland China exhibit close economic ties and a 
high level of cooperation between monetary authorities. Thus there are no obstacles 
standing in the way of monetary union between the Hong Kong SAR and the Mainland 
except for the convertibility of the RMB.  
 
Possibility of Integration under ‘One Country, Two Systems’ 
The Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR does not prevent the formation of an FTA and 
some kind of monetary union. But a customs union would violate the original customs 
system of the Hong Kong SAR. Moreover a common trade policy and a single 
currency with a supra-territorial central bank is also impossible, for the Basic Law of 
the Hong Kong SAR prevents the establishment of a common organization between 
the Hong Kong SAR and Mainland China. The most difficult issue for Hong Kong is 
the free movement of labor, which would be the key to the creation of a common 
market. We can therefore conclude that there is a difference between the degree of 
difficulty of integration under the‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula and the 
assumption central to Balassa’s theory.  
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Tokyo:Iwanami Sinsho, pp97. (in Japanese)  
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4. Current Status of Integration: Problems concerning the 
CEPA 
 Integration under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula is only just beginning, 
and so far, the CEPA is the only form of institutional integration between the Hong 
Kong SAR and Mainland China. This section provides an overview of the political 
process underlying the initiation and negotiation of the CEPA, and clarifies the position 
concerning the stake holders of the CEPA and attendant problems. 
 
CEPA: the motives underlying its formation, and the processes 
involved 
The CEPA was proposed as a response to the PRC’s accession to the WTO by the 
HKGCC, as mentioned above. Before the official announcement of negotiations on the 
formation of an FTA (later referred to as the CEPA), the PRC central government and 
the government of the Hong Kong SAR seemed to have reached some degree of 
consensus by way of informal negotiations. But, before the negotiations, there was no 
feasibility study concerning an FTA (or CEPA), except for HKGCC’s summary of the 
opinions of the industrial sectors. Moreover the negotiations for an FTA or CEPA were 
such a sensitive issue for the central government that An Min, the Vice Minister of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, denied that FTA negotiations were underway 
with the Hong Kong SAR after another Vice Minister of MOFTEC, Long Yongtu, had 
indicated the existence of the discussions.  
On 26 December 2001, the Macao SAR government also announced its intention to 
take part in the CEPA negotiations. However, the two CEPA negotiations between the 
Mainland and Hong Kong and between the Mainland and Macao were held separately, 
with the former preceding the latter. The first negotiations were held on 25 January 
2002, in Beijing, and it was agreed that the CEPA should be the title of “some form of 
FTA” (54) so as to avoid the political sensitivity of the discussions for the PRC’s 
                                                  
(54) "Formal Consultations on Mainland/HK Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement starts" 
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relationship with Taiwan. The participants also agreed that the CEPA should include an 
FTA covering goods and services, as well as arrangements concerning investment - in 
other words a series of arrangements essentially similar to the FTAs that have been 
established by developed countries.  
The HKGCC and the Hong Kong business community hoped that the CEPA 
negotiations would be completed within a year. They saw the purpose of the CEPA as 
providing preferential treatment for Hong Kong companies in the service sector, with 
the formation of an FTA on the GATS rules (55). The PRC made concessions by agreeing 
to begin opening the China market to foreign capital after 2003-07. This means that 
after 2007, the preferential treatment provided by CEPA will have lost its meaning.  
But, there nevertheless remained some obstacles to the creation of the CEPA. First, 
the PRC had just joined the WTO, and had begun to open up the Mainland market. It 
was therefore impracticable to open the market only for Hong Kong companies. Second, 
the PRC was uneasy over the definition of a “Hong Kong company” (a service supplier 
and investor from Hong Kong). If the definition were too strict, the CEPA might attract 
only a few foreign companies to invest in Hong Kong, and might give little 
encouragement to multi-national companies who might otherwise see Hong Kong as an 
appropriate location for their regional headquarters. On the other hand, if the definition 
were too loose, the CEPA might pose a serious economic threat to indigenous 
companies on the Mainland.  
An FTA based on the GATT rules (on trade of goods) is relatively easy to operate in 
the case of Hong Kong and Mainland China. Only a few factories and farmers are 
located in Hong Kong. But in the case of CEPA, the PRC central government’s 
interpretation of the rule of origin is a strict one. Meanwhile the Hong Kong side has 
insisted on a low rate of local content requirement. The HKGCC suggested two 
alternatives for local content: less than 30%, and 20% from Hong Kong with 20% from 
                                                                                                                                                  
Hong Kong SAR Government Press Release, January 25, 2002 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200201/25/0125310.htm (accessed June 26, 2006). 
(55) Christopher Cheng. 2002. Regional Trade Agreement with Mainland, not Preferential 
Treatment. Hong Kong: Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce. 
http://www.chamber.org.hk/wto/rta/rta_by_cc.asp (accessed July 13, 2006) 
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the Mainland (added value standard). The former suggestion was incorporated into the 
CEPA, and the latter one was rejected. 
The CEPA negotiations were not as straightforward as had been predicted, and were 
not completed until the end of June 2003. Details such as the rule of origin and the 
definition of suppliers in Hong Kong, were not settled until the end of September 2003. 
The final implementation of CEPA exceeded the target set by the Hong Kong business 
community by a year, and came into operation on 1st January 2004. 
 
The Background of CEPA : political elements in Hong Kong 
A power-shift in Hong Kong politics, from bureaucrats to business leaders, signaled a 
sudden change of policy towards the creation of an FTA by the Hong Kong SAR 
government. Before the handover, the highest authority in Hong Kong was the Governor, 
and before being appointed, most Governors had served as colonial administrators or 
diplomats. Most of the Secretaries were also former bureaucrats, except for a few 
individuals who were appointed from the business community. But since the handover, 
the Chief Executive has been elected by an election committee, not a few members of 
which are from the business community. The first Chief Executive, Tung Chee Hwa, 
began making political appointments, of the three major secretaries, after his accession, 
and in 2002 introduced the Principal Officials Accountability System (主要官員問責
制) to politically appoint other secretaries. Tung himself had been the chairman of 
Orient Overseas, the largest shipping company in Hong Kong, and he appointed 
secretaries who were also originally from the business community(56).  
                                                  
(56)  The former Financial Secretary, Antony Leung Kam-chung (梁錦松) (he resigned in 2002 
over the Lexusgate scandal) is former Asia-Pacific chairman, Chase Manhattan. His successor 
as Financial Secretary and the former Secretary for Commerce, Industry and Technology, Henry 
Tang Ying Yen (唐英年), is the former chairman of Peninsula Knitters(半島針織廠) and a 
former member of the Liberal Party, which represents the interests of the business community. 
The Secretary of Financial Services and Treasury, Frederick Ma Si-hang (馬時亨) is also from 
the world of business, and is a former financial officer of Pacific Century Cyber Works (電訊盈
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The business community has a strong influence in Hong Kong politics, reflecting the 
fact that the business community has taken over almost half of the functional 
constituencies within the SAR. The Chief Executive is elected by an Election 
Committee, the members of which are mainly from functional constituencies. Half of 
the Legislative Council members are also elected by functional constituencies. The 
HKGCC, the body which proposed the CEPA, and the member companies of the 
HKGCC is allocated positions in the Commercial (First) and Industrial (First) 
constituencies . Moreover the industrial sectors insisting on the need for a CEPA, 
namely textiles and banking (finance) (57), also have their own constituencies. For 
example Henry Tang and James Tien Pei Chun (田北俊), the leader of Liberal Party and 
ex-member of Executive Council, both belong to the textiles sector business community. 
Furthermore, lawyers, accountants, engineers, and architects also have their own 
constituencies and receive benefits from CEPA, which is an FTA based on the GATS 
rules. So the shift of power to the business community, following the handover, has 
been a key factor underlying the Hong Kong SAR government’s policy change towards 
promoting an FTA or the CEPA . 
Another factor was the poor level of achievement of the Tung Chee Hwa 
administration. Failures that could be laid at the door of the Tung administration 
included the pursuit of an excessively aggressive housing policy that was opposed by 
house-owners and land developers, and the poor management of the influenza crisis in 
1997 and the SARS crisis in 2003. On the other hand, some issues were not attributable 
to the Tung administration. For example, the long recession that lasted from 1995 to 
2003 was not Tung’s responsibility, but reflected the fact that Article 107 of the Basic 
Law prevents the implementation of Keynesian-style policy for boosting demand in the 
economy. Moreover the National Security Bill was such a sensitive issue that Secretary 
for Security Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee (葉劉淑儀) was made to resign following the 
debate in the Legislative Council. But Tung had no choice but to promote the Bill, 
because he was pushed to introduce it by the PRC central government and by Article 23 
of the Basic Law. 
                                                                                                                                                  
科), which took over the SAR’s largest telecom company, Hong Kong Telecom. 
(57) HKGCC. op.cit., pp.26, 45, 110 
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In any case, Tung needed to be reelected as Chief Executive in the election in 2002. 
Although the CEPA was not his own idea and he had initially hesitated to propose it to 
the PRC central government, it was an easy way to stimulate the Hong Kong economy 
without incurring any expenditure or extra burden, and was a useful way of gaining the  
support of the  business community.  
 
Challenges and anxieties surrounding economic integration 
The political system in Hong Kong SAR favors the business community, and tends to 
ignore the interests of the citizens, who function both as consumers and as workers. In 
2002, the Financial Secretary, Antony Leung, refused to open the result of a public 
opinion survey on the CEPA that had been held earlier in 2002 (58). It is fortunate for 
Hong Kong’s citizens that Hong Kong was a free port even before CEPA and that CEPA 
had no negative impact either on the Hong Kong economy or on the citizens as workers. 
However generally, an FTA also has the function of promoting competition and 
reducing the prices of goods and services to the contracting parties. It follows that the 
CEPA, without giving away concessions on the Hong Kong side, should be examined in 
terms of the extent to which it will serve the future needs of the citizens as consumers. 
During the CEPA negotiations, the Hong Kong SAR government considered the 
possibility of introducing a Land and Sea Departure Tax, which would have 
contradicted the terms of the CEPA. In fact, the Hong Kong SAR government dropped 
the idea after an anti-National Security Bill demonstration on 1st July 2003. One of the 
reasons why the government wished to introduce this tax was the need to reduce the 
deficit in the government budget. But another reason was the tax’s attraction as a means 
of reducing competition between retail sellers in Hong Kong SAR and those in 
Shenzhen City, on the Mainland. This tax would have imposed a financial burden on 
citizens not only as consumers, but also as workers, for the number of Hong Kong 
residents who are working in Shenzhen City and other cities in Guangdong Province is 
increasing.  
                                                  
(58) “LCQ6: Mainland/Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement” Press Release of 
Hong Kong SAR Government, October 23, 2002. 
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Furthermore, close economic and social ties between Hong Kong and the Mainland 
also cause difficulties. The CEPA concentrates on economic issues such as trade, 
services, and tourism. It excludes following issues, such as the protection of intellectual 
property rights, food safety, disease control, and cooperation on the suppression of 
criminal groups. Some issues, such as cooperation to control crime, are related to 
human rights, and are therefore sensitive areas which have caused hesitation rather than 
action. Some issues are difficult to accommodate under the ‘One Country, Two 
Systems’ formula. 
The CEPA itself has been challenged by the governmental and legal system on the 
Mainland. On the Mainland, governments implement a wide range of social and 
economic regulations. But local governments in the Mainland sometimes do not 
understand the CEPA, and reject applications by Hong Kong companies to invest locally 
and set up business operations. The business community is unhappy with the 
correspondence between the Hong Kong SAR government and the central government. 
The case of Leung Chun Ying, an architect, entrepreneur, and a member of the 
Executive Council of the Hong Kong SAR Government, provides an example of the 
sort of misunderstanding that can arise. The Shanghai City government rejected the 
establishment of an office by the Hong Kong architect, publicized this in the press, and 
criticized the current dispute settlement mechanism of the CEPA and the passivism of 
the Chief Executive, Tung and the Hong Kong SAR government (59).  
Although an FTA can be seen as the first step towards economic integration, most 
FTAs, including the CEPA, are merely trade agreements, and often fall far short of the 
ideal of full economic integration. The implementation of CEPA has certainly 
encountered many obstacles (60), and considerable difficulties surround the promotion of 
                                                  
(59) “Leung Chun Ying: the impact of CEPA is not what we expected”.(梁振英﹕CEPA效果遜
預期)” Mingpao News(明報), January 2, 2005 
 “Leung Chun Ying, the Chairman of Hong Kong Coalition of Professional Services: the impact 
of CEPA is unclear.(香港專業聯盟主席梁振英：CEPA成效未彰)” Singtao Daily(星島日報), 
June 30, 2006.  
(60) Takayuki Takeuchi. 2006. Mainland China-Hong Kong CEPA and the East Asian FTA 
Initiative. (unfinished manuscript, will be published by IDE-JETRO, as a part of the final report 
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more extensive and deeper economic integration. The ‘One Country, Two Systems’ 
formula still causes the Hong Kong SAR government to hesitate before embarking on 
deeper and closer cooperation and exchange with the Mainland.  
But, in fact, the lack of democracy and autonomy are also key obstacles, especially so 
far as closer exchange with local governments and ministries of central government on 
the Mainland is concerned. The same is the case when it comes to signing agreements 
with the Mainland on the surrender of fugitive offenders. Not only the Hong Kong SAR 
government, but also pro-democracy groups have to worry that excessively close ties 
with the Mainland authorities might provide an opportunity for authoritarian 
‘intervention’ from the Mainland. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  





The Mainland-Hong Kong CEPA was set up with the maintenance of the ‘One 
Country, Two Systems’ formula as its basic premise. But ‘Two Systems’ should not be 
taken to imply a complete separation between Mainland China and Hong Kong, even 
with respect to economic systems and policy. The PRC Central government and the 
Hong Kong business leaders formed an alliance to maintain and stabilize the political 
and economic system before the handover. The ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula 
depends on the their economic interest.  
The CEPA between the Mainland and Hong Kong was intended to be nothing more 
than an alternative for the preferential treatment of Hong Kong companies in Mainland 
China, following the accession of the PRC to the WTO, and it should not be seen as an 
instrument for integrating the two territories over the long term. However, it is possible 
not only to sign and implement an FTA, but also to form a monetary union, which even 
under the current Basic Law of Hong Kong SAR would officially allow the mutual 
circulation of the RMB and the Hong Kong Dollar. Steven Cheung has predicted that 
the Hong Kong Dollar will be abolished after the RMB becomes a hard currency, but 
there is another obstacle, namely the current Basic Law of the SAR. This paper does not 
assume that opinion inside and outside of Hong Kong is likely to demand amendment of 
the SAR Basic Law as a means of realizing monetary union. But if other East Asian 
countries engage in increasingly close monetary cooperation, to the extent of realizing 
monetary integration, Hong Kong might well be involved. 
The Hong Kong SAR government has not taken the interests of the Hong Kong 
residents as citizens (workers and consumers) into account in the implementation of 
economic policy, an omission that reflects the lack of democracy under the ‘One 
Country, Two Systems’ formula. The author has pointed out that the will of Hong Kong, 
not enforcement by the PRC central government, is the key to integrating Hong Kong 
SAR and Mainland China on the same basis as sovereign states. It is without doubt that 
the CEPA was proposed by the  government of the Hong Kong SAR. But it is not 
apparent whether or not the Hong Kong SAR government stands for Hong Kong 
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residents. Some of the policies pursued by the SAR government seem to stand for 
business and are more concerned with the merits of economic integration for the 
business community than with the interests of the citizens. The economic 
interdependency between Mainland China and Hong Kong makes new demands not 
only on economic affairs, but also on social policy, for a large number of Hong Kong 
residents are working in Mainland China. 
Economic integration under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula seems to imply 
a change to a ‘One System’ formula. But economic integration need not mean the end 
of the ‘Two Systems’, if Hong Kong SAR obtains complete autonomy and realizes 
complete democratization, by way of universal franchise elections of the Chief 
Executive and the Legislative Council. There should be a shift in the emphasis of the 
‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula from economics to politics. Moreover economic 
integration is likely to be inevitable, even between sovereign states in East Asia. So we 
should not be pessimistic concerning the possibility of economic integration between 
Hong Kong and Mainland China.  
Democratization would help to change the characteristics and emphasis of the 
relationship between Hong Kong and China to the advantage of the citizens of the 
Hong Kong SAR. What is important is not which is the priority issue, ‘One Country’ or 
‘Two Systems’, but who are the stake holders in the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ system, 




（亞洲經濟研究所 區域研究中心 東亞研究小組） 
 
1997 年回歸後、香港維持原來的法律和經濟制度，國際法人的地位、沒有被大陸統
合（整合）。香港基本法保證 2047年之前，香港特別行政區可以保留獨特制度。但
是密接的陸港經濟關係會促進更深入的經濟整合。基本法對經濟整合的限制只有
組織關稅同盟和引進單一貨幣等許措施。基本法沒禁止自由貿易協定和（不採用單
一貨幣的）通貨同盟。ＦＴＡ以“內地與香港更密經貿關係安排＂（ＣＥＰＡ）為
名稱，已經成立了。包括行政長官（特首）董建華和官僚的香港特別行政區政府對
跟區域性措施表示反對或不願意的態度。不過香港商界積極要求特首跟中央政府
談判ＦＴＡ、結果特首沒辦法忽視商界的要求，改變態度。將來經濟整合發展到那
些程度還不明瞭。但是現在的香港政府不得不重視商界和企業的意見和利益、所以
作者認為發展經濟整合對香港獨特制度和地位的影響。但是如果香港實現完善的
民主主義制度、對取得完全的自治的問題也有幫助，實現經濟兩制轉變政治兩制。
以後經濟整合和一國兩制之間，問題不會出現。香港政府也會考慮商界和民眾之間
利益調整。 
